Medicate-to-Execute: Current Trends in Death Penalty Jurisprudence and the Perils of Dual Loyalty by Shaivitz, Daniel S.
Journal of Health Care Law and Policy
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 7
Medicate-to-Execute: Current Trends in Death
Penalty Jurisprudence and the Perils of Dual
Loyalty
Daniel S. Shaivitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Health Law Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of Health Care Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel S. Shaivitz, Medicate-to-Execute: Current Trends in Death Penalty Jurisprudence and the Perils of Dual Loyalty, 7 J. Health Care L.
& Pol'y 149 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol7/iss1/7
COMMENT
MEDICATE-TO-EXECUTE: CURRENT TRENDS IN DEATH
PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PERILS OF DUAL
LOYALTY
DANIEL S. SHAIVITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care professionals fulfill many roles during a criminal prosecution.
Caring for defendants throughout the process is critical to the success of our
criminal justice system. Because our justice system is largely based on principles
of "just desserts," retribution, and deterrence, persons who cannot comprehend
certain acts as wrongful should not receive the same punitive treatment as persons
who can. Likewise, individuals lacking the competence to understand principles of
wrongfulness should be spared the most severe sanctions. The process begins
when defense counsel, the government, or the court detects behavior indicative of
mental illness. Next, one of the parties, through a motion, or the court acting sua
sponte, must request a psychological evaluation of the defendant and a subsequent
evaluation that confirms the belief of the movant that the defendant is not
competent.' Examinations may be ordered for myriad reasons.2 A defendant may
lose and regain competence throughout the various stages of the prosecution. That
a defendant's competence may fluctuate is especially significant when a defendant
receives a death penalty sentence.
Individuals deemed incompetent may not be executed. However, the law
is beginning to permit the involuntary medication of persons who lack competence
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, Maryland). Special thanks to
Professor Edward Tomlinson of the University of Maryland School of Law and Kristine Callahan for
their input and interest in this piece.
1. See Charles Patrick Ewing, "Above All, Do No Harm: " The Role of Health and Mental Health
Professionals in the Capital Punishment Process, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 461,463 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
2. See id. Generally, defense counsel tends to raise this issue pro forma, or it may stem from a
genuine judicial concern regarding the mental health of the defendant. The government may raise this
issue merely as the machinery of discovery. A court would normally desire such an inquiry be made
due to the nature of the offense or the prospective punishments sought by the prosecution. Id.
3. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
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at various points in the criminal justice system.4 Most commonly, involuntary
medication occurs during the trial phase. However, courts have recently developed
a willingness to involuntarily medicate persons specifically to re-establish
competence for execution. 5 This judicially created doctrine fails to address the
moral and ethical responsibilities of health care professionals who serve the
criminal justice system. Health care professionals experience complex conflicts of
interest when they make determinations of competence in these circumstances. It
is the responsibility of the health care professional to consider the prospect of
medicating the convicted offender in order to restore the offender's competence for
execution. Health care professionals should never be required to cause the death of
a patient, directly or indirectly, regardless of the patient's criminal history.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to the Eighth Circuit in
Singleton v. Norris.6  With that denial, the Court unfortunately yielded the
opportunity to resolve this hotly debated issue. As a result, brewing conflicts
between fundamentally relied upon principles of medical ethics and currently
unfolding death penalty jurisprudence will likely reach a critical mass as medicate-
to-execute schemes gain acceptance through practice. By the time the next
opportunity arises in which a state involuntarily medicates a death row inmate and
the Court has occasion to review it, medicate-to-execute schemes may have
developed more widespread support rendering their opponents more helpless than
they currently are. Moreover, the Court should have taken the opportunity to settle
the building conflict between the states.7
By passing on Singleton, the Court endangered the future influential power
of medical ethics over the integrity of the medical professional and the safety of
patients. While the legal issues surrounding Singleton are controversial on their
face, the underlying conflict between criminal jurisprudence and accepted
standards of medical professionals poses a much greater threat. Medical
professionals, as common participants in the judicial process, should not be
alienated by conflicting ethical and legal directives. If the Court continues to favor
the decision of the Eighth Circuit enunciated in Singleton,8 the judiciary will be in
danger of developing roles for health care professionals that directly contradict the
established, fundamental moral and ethical principles of their profession. When
4. E.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003).
6. 124 S.Ct. 74 (2003).
7. In two states of differing circuits, this issue has risen to the highest court in the state -
Louisiana and South Carolina. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 764 (La. 1992); Singleton v. State,
437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993); Singleton v. State, 623 S.W.2d 180 (Ark. 1981), cert denied 456 U.S. 938;
Singleton v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1395 (8h Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874 (1989); Singleton v.
Lockhard, 962 F.2d 1315 (8" Cir. 1992), cert denied 506 U.S. 964 (1992); Singleton v. Endell, 870
S.W.2d 742 (Ark. 1994), cert denied sub nom. Singleton v. Norris, 513 U.S. 960 (1994); Singleton v.
Norris, cert denied 522 U.S. 840 (1997).
8. Singleton, 319 F.3d 1018.
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given the opportunity, the Court must reverse the Eighth Circuit to prevent the
further erosion of the ethical standards of health care practitioners.
This comment addresses the mounting conflict between health care
professionals and medicate-to-execute schemes. Part II introduces the evolving
nature of the Court's protection of mentally ill defendants, and addresses the
increased and diversified use of medication throughout the criminal prosecution
process. In addition, Part II introduces Singleton and illustrates the gravity of the
holding. Part III explores the most recognized codes of medical ethics, evaluating
their origins, current impact, and endangered future. Further, Part III identifies the
underlying conflict at issue in Singleton by developing upon the roles of health
care professionals and the conflicts of interest that occur as a result of their dual
loyalty to their patients and the criminal justice system in which they are forced to
operate.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Until Singleton, the Supreme Court had been progressive in its continual
acknowledgement of the need to protect mentally incompetent persons throughout
the criminal prosecution process. Despite the Court's increased respect for the
effects of mental illness on offenders during all stages of the criminal justice
system, increasingly physicians have experienced a judicial interference with their
practice. By granting certiorari in Singleton, the Court should have halted the
constriction of the medical practice that has taken place of late. An investigation
of the controlling case law will provide the necessary understanding of what
protections the Supreme Court has established for the mentally ill and how this
current issue challenges that law.
A. The Controlling Case Law
The Court has protected mentally ill persons convicted of capital offenses
from execution. 9  By protecting mentally ill individuals, the Court has
demonstrated an increased understanding of mental illness and its effects on
offenders. Among the circumstances discussed by the courts are when the state
can medicate mentally ill defendants to render them competent to stand trial, when
the state can medicate mentally ill defendants during incarceration, and when the
state can medicate mentally ill defendants to render them competent for execution.
In each of these circumstances, a unique standard is utilized to determine
competence.
9. See Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the state must afford a "full and fair hearing"
when a petitioner challenges his competence to be executed). The holding was made in light of a
Florida statute that did not provide an adequate fact-finding procedure. Id.
2004]
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Since 1960, the Supreme Court has recognized the plight of mentally
incompetent defendants.'l In Dusky, the Court changed the standard used to assess
competence to stand trial.11 According to the Court, a person must have "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding - and ... ha[ve] a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.' 2 In order to gauge this ability, a licensed or certified
health care professional, by court order, must perform a psychological examination
of the defendant. 13  The health care professional's report must discuss the
defendant's medical history and present symptoms, a record of the tests employed
in the examination, the health care professional's findings, statements of opinion as
to diagnosis and prognosis, and most importantly, whether the health professional
believes that the defendant is competent under the language set forth in Dusky.'4
In these instances, health care professionals are called upon to make quasi-judicial
determinations.
In Ford v. Wainwright,15 the Court prohibited states from executing
prisoners lacking mental competence; a decision in line with common law
jurisprudence.' 6 Ford was sentenced to death for murder in 1974.17 After several
years of incarceration, he developed a psychological disorder that led to the
progressive deterioration of his mental competence.' 8 A habeas corpus petition
was filed on behalf of Ford, asking the Court to stay his execution. 19  In
considering this petition, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Eighth
Amendment prevented the execution of an insane defendant. 20 Justice Marshall,
writing for the majority, recognized the parallel practices in historic records and
current national trends and found that the practice of executing the insane "simply
offends humanity."'21 The Ford doctrine provides that when a prisoner challenges
his or her own competence via a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a de novo
evidentiary hearing in federal district court is available. 22 The Ford decision was a
success for its extension of humanitarianism to mentally incompetent persons, and
10. See Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
11. Id. at 402.
12. Id.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2000).
14. Id.
15. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
16. Id. at 401, 406-408.
17. Id. at 401.
18. Id. at 402.
19. Id. at 404.
20. Id. at 404; "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
21. Ford, 477 U.S., at 408, 409.
22 Id at418.
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it set the stage for the current issue by acknowledging the potentially fluctuating
mental status of death row inmates.
The Court considered procedural due process protections afforded to
incompetent persons in Washington v. Harper,23 specifically, whether a hearing
was necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment before a mentally ill prisoner
could be involuntarily medicated. 24 Harper was incarcerated initially for robbery,
during which time he consented to the administration of psychotropic medication. 25
As a condition of his parole, the court forced Harper to receive psychiatric
26treatment. Despite his treatment, Harper assaulted two nurses and the court
revoked his parole.27 Upon his return to state custody, Harper was sent to the
Special Offender Center where psychiatrists diagnosed him with "a manic-
depressive disorder.- 28 Initially, Harper consented to treatment, including the use
of antipsychotic medications, but later refused medical treatment.29 Pursuant to
Special Offender Center Policy 600.30, the physicians who treated Harper
attempted to administer medication over his objections.30
The Court found that Policy 600.30 comported with procedural and
substantive due process. 3' Policy 600.30 provided the following protections to
defendants in Harper's situation:
First, if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should be treated with
antipsychotic drugs but the inmate does not consent, the inmate may be
subjected to involuntary treatment with the drugs only if [the inmate] (1)
suffers from a "mental disorder" and (2) is "gravely disabled" or poses a
"likelihood of serious harm" to himself, others, or their property. Only a
psychiatrist may order or approve the medication. Second an inmate
who refuses to take the medication voluntarily is entitled to a hearing
before a special committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist,
and the Associate Superintendent of the Center, none of whom may be,
at the time of the hearing, involved in the inmate's treatment or
diagnosis. If the committee determines by a majority vote that the
inmate suffers from a mental disorder and is gravely disabled or
dangerous, the inmate may be medicated against his will, provided the
psychiatrist is in the majority. Third, the inmate has certain procedural
rights before, during, and after the hearing .... Fourth, after the initial
23. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
24. Id. at 213.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 214.
27. Id.
28. Harper, 494 U.S. at 214.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 227.
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hearing, involuntary medication can continue only with periodic
review.
32
By following this Policy, the state fulfilled its obligations to provide
mentally ill inmates with treatment and protect those surrounding them in an
institutional setting.33 The test enunciated in Harper made it clear that an inmate
can be involuntarily medicated "if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest., 34  While appreciating the
importance of the liberty interest at stake, the Court opined that the prison
environment, considered in concert with the dangerousness of the defendant,
constituted a serious enough threat to approve the treatment of a patient with
antipsychotic drugs without the defendant's consent.35
The Harper Court held that the Policy satisfied the requirements of
procedural due process, and reasoned that the adjudicatory process within the
Policy did not require a judicial decision maker.36 Instead, the Court imposed this
balancing role upon a medical professional. At this "full judicial hearing," where
the patient has the right to counsel,37 the decision maker conducts two inquiries:
(1) "whether the inmate suffers from a 'mental disorder;' and (2) "whether, as a
result of that disorder, he is dangerous to himself, others, or their property., 38
While the Court "allowed" medical professionals to perform a judicial role, 39 it
failed to consider the awkward position medical professionals would be subjected
to when making adjudications regarding their own patients.
32. Id. at 215-16. The rights granted the inmate included the right to notice of the Center's intent
to convene an involuntary medication hearing, the right to attend the hearing, present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to assistance from a lay adviser who has not been involved in the
case and who understands the psychiatric issues involved. The court also granted the inmate the right to
appeal and seek judicial review of a committee decision. Id. at 216. In addition, the time period
specified for periodic review of involuntary medication was determined to be a term of fourteen days.
Id at 216 n.4.
33. Id. at 225-26.
34. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
35. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he extent of a prisoner's right under the [Due Process] Clause to
avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's
confinement." Id. at 222.
36. Id. at 231. The Court opined that a patient may be "better served" by such an arrangement. Id.
That point was especially so when the "patient is mentally disturbed, [and] his own intentions will be
difficult to assess and will be changeable in any event." Id. Also, the Court stated that the "risks
associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical
professionals." Id. at 233.
37. Id. at 228.
38. Id. at 232.
39. Id. at 231. More accurately, the Court imposed this role upon medical professionals. The
Court may have been motivated by the fact that such adjudications are inefficient with regards to
judicial economy and scarce prison resources. See id.at 232.
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In Riggins v. Nevada,4 ° the Court firmly stated that, when a state medicates
persons for the purpose of rendering them competent to stand trial, due process
requires that the proposed treatment be "medically appropriate and, considering
less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the defendant's] own safety or
the safety of others."' Writing for the Court in Riggins, Justice O'Connor created
a test favoring the rights of defendants to be free from unwanted antipsychotic
42medication during trial. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that a
test closely resembling strict scrutiny43 makes it abundantly clear that states cannot
involuntarily medicate individuals, except when faced with exceptional
circumstances."a In a nearly unanimous reversal of the Nevada Supreme Court's
affirmation of the defendant's conviction and death sentence,45 the Court bolstered
its protection of mentally ill defendants.
David Riggins was convicted of the November 20, 1987 murder and
robbery of Paul Wade.46 Soon after his arrest, Riggins complained that he was
hearing voices and that he was experiencing difficulty sleeping.4 7 The physicians
who treated Riggins gradually increased his prescription of Mellaril, an
antipsychotic drug, from 100 milligrams per day to 800 milligrams per day.48
After a series of inconsistent psychiatric examinations, Riggins stood trial, and he
petitioned the trial court to suspend the administration of antipsychotic medications
until the end of the trial.49
After the district court held an evidentiary hearing which barely satisfied
procedural due process requirements, Riggins' motion was denied. 50 Although the
District Court heard evidence with respect to Riggins' competency and the effects
40. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
41. Id. at 135.
42. Id. at 135-36.
43. While the majority refutes the dissent's argument that this test is in fact strict scrutiny, it is
hard to believe that it is not. See id. at 136.
44. Id. at 145. Justice Kennedy stated that "[i]f the State cannot render the defendant competent
without involuntary medication, then it must resort to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the
defendant becomes competent through other means. If the defendant cannot be tried without his
behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial way by involuntary treatment . . . the
Constitution requires that society bear this cost in order to preserve the integrity of the trial process." Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 128. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented. Id. at 146.
46. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 130.
50. See id. at 130-31. The effect of suspending the administration of the medication was the
subject of speculation by the psychiatrists who evaluated Riggins for the purposes of determining his
competence to stand trial. Id. Additionally, the District Court's denial of Riggins' motion was
composed of a one-page order that provided no indication of how the Court reached its conclusion. Id.
at 131
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of the medication from four physicians, the court made no mention of any relevant
findings of fact when it denied Riggins' motion to terminate medication. 51 As
indicated by Justice O'Connor, at least two of those physicians relied on
guesswork when evaluating Riggins' case.52 In addition, the physicians each came
to different, and equally uncertain, conclusions.53 Despite the inconsistencies, the
District Court ordered Riggins to be medicated until the end of the trial.54
The Supreme Court decided Riggins by applying the Harper test.5 The
Court restated the Harper test simply: the state cannot force antipsychotic drugs
on a convicted prisoner absent (1) "a finding of overriding justification;" and (2) "a
determination of medical appropriateness., 56  The Court reasoned that "once
Riggins moved to terminate administration of antipsychotic medication, the State
became obligated to establish the need for Mellaril and the medical appropriateness
of the drug., 57 In Riggins, the Court unfortunately did little to further define the
meaning of "medical appropriateness." The Court instead presumed the medical
appropriateness of the treatment despite the fact that Riggins "received a very high
dose" of Mellaril. 58 The definition of medical appropriateness still requires further
development by the Court.
The Court also held that both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication without
applying the proper procedural test and substantive inquiry. 59 What is unfortunate,
however, is that the Court made its determination without separating these
individual analyses. 60  The Court first stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment
affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for trial" as it
affords convicts. As for the remainder of the jumbled analysis, the Court
reasoned that "[e]fforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice . . . would be futile,
and guesses whether the outcome of the trial might have been different if Riggins'
motion had been granted would be purely speculative." 62  The Court
acknowledged, however, the strong possibility that "Riggins' defense was impaired
51. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 131.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 133-35. The Court specifically distinguished Riggins from Harper, however, on the
grounds that Harper applied specifically to inmates, as apposed to criminal defendants at the time of
trial. Id. at 134-35.
56. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 133.
59. See id. at 137-38.
60. See id
61. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
62 Id at 137
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due to the administration of Mellaril.,,63  Further, the Court stated that expert
testimony to that effect would have little impact, if any, on the prejudice caused by
the forced administration of Mellaril.64 Despite the clarity of the test stated in
Riggins, the Court provided little guidance for future courts dealing with the
minutiae of similarly situated defendants.
In 1995, a squeamish Fifth Circuit denied judicial review to a death row
inmate suffering from paranoid schizophrenia on the issue of whether he could be
involuntarily medicated to preserve his competence for execution.65 The court
faltered when given the opportunity to review the merits of the petitioner's last-
minute claim that his rights were being violated by the involuntary administration
of Haldol by the state. Instead of concerning itself with the issue at hand, the court
deferred to procedural rules that, in effect, disallowed petitioner's claim.66 Though
the facts of the case and the grounds under which the claims were brought are
admittedly suspect, 67 the court ultimately wavered in the face of this opportunity to
consider the involuntary medication of a prisoner for execution. This is amplified
by the fact that the court largely ignored the testimony of a medical professional.68
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia attempted to elaborate
on the "medical appropriateness" prong of the Harper test in U.S. v. Weston.69 In
1998, Weston stormed the U.S. Capitol armed with a .38 caliber firearm.7 ° Weston
shot and killed two U.S. Capitol Police officers and seriously wounded a third.71
After the District Court found Weston incompetent to stand trial, he spent time at
the Federal Corrections Institute in Butner, North Carolina, during which time he
was placed in solitary confinement in lieu of receiving treatment for mental
illness. 72 Because Weston refused the medical treatment offered to him by the
physicians at the federal facility, administrators placed him in solitary confinement
63. Id.
64. Id. at 137-38.
65. See Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 642 (5th Cir. 1995).
66. Id. at 642. The Fifth Circuit commented:
Albeit an interesting and important issue, Fearance has no vehicle to present it for our determination at
this last moment. . . . [T]here is no question that a claim for forcible medication could have arisen from
these treatments before his first state hearing, and certainly prior to his second state petition in 1992.
Id. at 642, 643.
67. See id. at 635. Fearance brought this group of claims as a last-minute attempt to have his
execution stayed. Id.
68. See id. at 641. "This court specifically held that a doctor's 'conclusion' that the petitioner
'suffers from paranoid schizophrenia falls woefully short of a finding that petitioner is so deranged that
he is unaware that he is about to be put to death as a result of his earlier conviction and sentence for
murder."' Id.
69. 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
70. Id. at 874.
71. Id. Weston was also seriously wounded by gunfire during the attempt to arrest him. Id.
72. Id. at 874-75.
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to "mitigate his dangerousness. 73 In accordance with the established requirements
of due process, the government obtained an order to administer anti-psychotic
medication against Weston's will. 74  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling that it was appropriate to forcibly medicate Weston.75
Under the precedent set forth in Riggins and Harper, the Court of Appeals
was forced to determine whether the proposed medication was "medically
appropriate. 76 The test for "medical appropriateness" enunciated by the District
Court in Weston required the decision maker to balance the potential benefits of the
treatment against the potential detriments of treatment. 77 The Court of Appeals
ultimately concluded that the determination of "medical appropriateness" relies
heavily on "the judgment of medical professionals." 78 While this definition of
"medical appropriateness" is of limited value as precedent, it is valuable
nonetheless because it attempts to address a concept that has been left largely
undeveloped by the courts.
The Eighth Circuit incorporated the Weston definition of "medical
appropriateness" in U.S. v. Sell.79 Charles Sell was charged with health care fraud,
attempted murder, conspiracy, and solicitation to commit violence. 80 Most of that
conduct related to the false claims for services Sell submitted to Medicaid in the
course of his dental practice. 81 Sell was initially found to be competent, but a rapid
deterioration in his mental state became evident during his various bond
proceedings and throughout the pretrial process. 82 On a motion by the defense
counsel, Sell was evaluated and diagnosed with delusional disorder, persecutory
type, by both the defendant's and prosecution's psychologists. 83 In light of those
evaluations, the district court found that Sell was incompetent to stand trial.84 A
magistrate judge then permitted Sell's forcible medication for the purposes of
treatment and restoring his competence to stand trial.85 That order was later upheld
73. Id. at 875.
74. Weston, 255 F.3d at 875.
75. Id. at 876.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 876-78. The court employed more technical jargon, stating that the physician must
weigh "the capacity of antipsychotic drugs to alleviate [defendant's condition] (the medical benefits)
against their capacity to produce harm (the medical costs, or side effects)." Id. at 876-77.
78. Id. at 876.
79. 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 562.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 562-63.
83. Id. at 563. The persecutory subtype of delusional disorder is characterized by a person's belief
that he is being conspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, and generally obstructed in the pursuit of
long term goals. Id. at 563 n.3 (citing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV).
84. Sell, 282 F.3d at 563.
85. Id. at 564-65.
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by the district court.86 Sell appealed the holding, asking the Eighth Circuit to
determine whether he could be forcibly medicated "for the sole purpose of
restoring his competence to stand trial s7
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, stating that "Sell may be involuntarily medicated for the purpose of
rendering him competent to stand trial. 88 The court entered its judgment with the
following caveat:
[T]his is a limited holding. We do not believe this standard will be met
in all circumstances in which the government wishes to restore
competence. Furthermore, we note that an entirely different case is
presented when the government wishes to medicate a prisoner in order
to render him competent for execution.
89
Using the precedent previously discussed, the Eighth Circuit considered Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to involuntary medication. 90
The Eighth Circuit modeled its decision after the aforementioned legal
precedent, especially Harper and Riggins. First, the Eighth Circuit concurred with
the district court when it found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
Sell posed a danger to himself or others. 91 Second, the Eighth Circuit considered
whether Sell could be forcibly medicated solely to render him competent to stand
trial.92 For the purposes of that determination, the Eighth Circuit relied on the tests
developed in Harper and Riggins.93 Relying on those cases, the Eighth Circuit
held that it was permissible to medicate for the sole purpose of rendering Sell
competent to stand trial.94 Next, at Sell's urging, the Eighth Circuit considered
whether strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. 95 Refusing to adopt
strict scrutiny, the Eight Circuit found that the charges against Sell were serious
enough for the state to justify bringing him to trial.96 Additionally, the Eight
86. Id. at 565. The order to forcibly medicate was upheld, though the magistrate's reasoning was
considered faulty by the District Court. The District Court found that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or others and that the state's interest in restoring
Sell's competence for trial was sufficient to warrant the holding. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 572.
89. Sell, 282 F.3d.at 571.
90. See id. at 565-73.
91. Id. at 565.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 565-66.
94. Sell, 282 F.3d.at 566.
95. Id. at 567.
96. Id. at 568. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that "[d]espite Sell's significant liberty interest in
refusing antipsychotic medication, in view of the seriousness of the charges, we believe that the
government's interest in restoring his competence so that he may be brought to trial is paramount." Id.
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Circuit found that "there were no less intrusive means. 97 Lastly, the Eight Circuit
did not believe that the district court "committed clear error in finding that the
government proved medical appropriateness by clear and convincing evidence."
98
The Eighth Circuit also determined that Sell's Sixth Amendment rights had been
sufficiently provided for in this instance. Overall, Sell was a well-reasoned, well-
written demonstration of the applicable precedent.
The Supreme Court has created a barrage of common law standards and
tests for competence that are dedicated to the protection of mentally ill defendants.
The Court also balances this protection with the interests of the state in prosecuting
and punishing criminal offenders. Some courts have tested the strength of those
protections to find that the Supreme Court's protection is not absolute. If
certiorari had been granted, Singleton would have tested the Court in this regard.
B. Singleton v. Norris
A study of Singleton v. Norris99 illustrates the fragility of the Court's
protection of mentally ill defendants. Though the Eighth Circuit anticipated this
case in Sell,100 the current body of jurisprudence has not answered the question of
whether a state violates the Eighth Amendment when it involuntarily medicates a
person in order to render him competent for execution. Interpreting the current
law, the Eighth Circuit has decided to limit the protections afforded by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Court has not delivered an opinion to the contrary.'
0
'
In Singleton, the Eighth Circuit held that a person's Eighth Amendment
rights, as enunciated in Ford, are not violated when the State executes a prisoner
"who became incompetent during his long stay on death row but who subsequently
,,02
regained competency through appropriate medical care."' As a result, the Eighth
Circuit, en banc, denied Singleton's petition for writ of habeas corpus and/vacated
Singleton's stay of execution. 10 3  The court's reasoning followed the tests
enunciated in Ford, Harper, and Riggins.10 4 The Singleton court was persuaded by
the state's argument that it had an "essential," overriding interest in "carrying out a
97. Id. at 568.
98. Id. at 570. However, the Eighth Circuit did "acknowledge that there [was] a difference of
opinion on the efficacy of using antipsychotic drugs to treat delusional disorder." Id. In making this
determination, the Eighth Circuit reviewed volumes of medical testimony and research. See id. at 569-
71.
99. 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003).
100. U.S. v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 571 (8th Cir. 2002).
101. The Court denied certiorari and, as such, has not addressed this issue to any degree of
satisfaction. 124 S.Ct. 74 (2003) (Oct. 6, 2003).
102. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1023-24.
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lawfully imposed sentence."'10 5 Moreover, the court found the state's argument
especially compelling in a death penalty case. 106 The court found that Singleton's
interest in remaining free from medication was the inferior interest in this case
because (1) Singleton had preferred taking the medicine on prior occasions, and (2)
Singleton did not experience any side effects from taking the medications. 107
Charles Laverne Singleton was sentenced to death for the June 1, 1979
murder of Mary Lou York.10 8 Singleton entered a grocery store, grabbed York by
her neck and proceeded to stab her. 10 9 A witness, Patti Franklin, then heard York
scream that she was being killed by Singleton.1 0 After Franklin ran off for help,
Lenora Howard witnessed Singleton exiting the store and observed a bloody and
crying York 111 emerge from the store." 2 Soon thereafter, Police Officer Strother
arrived to find York in the rear of the store lying in a pool of her blood.," 3 York
was accompanied by her physician, Dr. J.D. Rankin, in the ambulance as she was
transported to the hospital. 1 4  York relayed a description of the events to Dr.
Rankin before she died."15
The Court of Appeals reacted viscerally in Singleton stating that
"[s]ociety's interest in punishing offenders is at its greatest in the narrow class of
capital murder cases in which aggravating factors justify imposition of the death
penalty."'"1 6 In furtherance of its decision, the Eighth Circuit found that treating
Singleton with antipsychotic drugs satisfied the test of medical appropriateness.
Specifically, the court was unable to find a less obtrusive means of accomplishing
the State's goals;"' "the medication [was] effective and ... the expected side
effects [did] not overwhelm the benefits of the medicine.""118  The court also
reasoned that in light of the determination that "the best medical interests of the
prisoner must be determined without regard to whether there is a pending date of
105. Id. at 1025.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1020. Singleton also received a life sentence for the robbery he
perpetrated in the same exchange. Id..
109. Singleton v. State, 623 S.W.2d 180, 181 (1981). York recounted the details of the attack to her
physician shortly before her death. Id.
I10. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. The money bag contained about $2.00 in change and the register in the store had a "small
amount of change in it." Id.
113. Id. York also told Officer Strother what had transpired. Id.
114. Id.
115. Singleton, 623 S.W.2d at 181. York died before she reached the emergency room. Id.
116. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1026.
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execution," the treatment was in the best medical interests of Singleton." 9 On
those grounds, the Eighth Circuit held that "the mandatory medication regime,
valid under the pendency of a stay of execution, does not become unconstitutional
under Harper when an execution date is set."'
120
As a result of the Eighth Circuit's decision, the ethics of medical
professionals are placed in conflict. In essence, a medical professional may treat
an incompetent prisoner with psychotropic drugs, rendering the prisoner competent
to be executed. On the other hand, the medical professional may deny treatment
desperately needed to control the imbalanced mind of a prisoner in order to
preserve the afflicted life of the prisoner. Neither option fits neatly into the ethics
that medical professionals take an oath to uphold. That conflict should have been
resolved by the Supreme Court on certiorari, however it was not.
III. HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND DUAL LOYALTY
Health care professionals play an increasingly large role in the criminal
justice system. Though the roles of health care professionals are in flux, their
respective codes of ethics remain reasonably static. As such, conflicts between
professional ethics and professional practice are likely to occur more often now
than ever. To understand the prevailing trends in medical ethics, it is necessary to
explore not only contemporary codes of ethics, but ancient codes as well. Because
of the ties that exist between current and historic codes of ethics, some current
principles are under attack because of tradition. As will be demonstrated, that is
the case with the Oath of Hippocrates and its successors. Due to the specific
involvement of psychiatrists in the criminal justice system, the press releases of the
American Psychiatric Association are studied as well as the Code of Medical
Ethics published by the American Medical Association. In this specific instance,
physicians face a particularly difficult conflict: dual loyalty. Dual loyalty
negatively affects the ability of physicians to perform their duty without
controversy.
A. The Roles of Health Care Professionals in the Criminal Justice System
119. Id. The Eighth Circuit had some difficulty reconciling the ultimate effect of the "medical
appropriateness" consideration in this instance. See id. at 1025-26.
120. Id. at 1026.
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The criminal justice system has increased its awareness of mental health
issues in the last half century. 12' This increased awareness by the judiciary and the
legislature of the necessary role that health care professionals play is an advanced
version of mid-1800s thinking, when insanity was considered a disease.122 By the
late 19th century, some already considered the insanity defense overused. 123 Only
recently has the Court prohibited the execution of the insane. 124 What these social
developments have in common is that they each implicate the need for health care
professionals to perform increasingly important roles in criminal proceedings.
Singleton now provides another opportunity to increase the role of physicians by
providing more circumstances in which psychological evaluations are allowed, as
well as increasing the offenders' opportunities for treatment.
The most important step for mentally incompetent defendants in the
criminal justice system is the initial assessment as to whether that defendant is in
fact incompetent. 125 In furtherance of that end, Dusky delegated a great role to
health care professionals that has since been codified. 26  The health care
professional may examine the defendant for a reasonable period not to exceed
thirty days in the health care facility nearest to the court. 127 As discussed in Part II
of this comment, court ordered examinations call for considerable analysis. The
decisions of the health care professional may trigger an indeterminate period of
commitment or continued participation in a criminal trial that might not be in the
defendant's best interest.
The determination regarding competence to stand trial is unlike most
determinations made in criminal jurisprudence. A defendant is found incompetent
if "by a preponderance of the evidence ... the defendant is presently suffering
from mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent ....,,128 This is
likely the result of the legislature's sensitivity to the needs of the mentally
incompetent. If the court finds that the defendant is competent, the prosecution
continues. 29 Defendants who are found to lack competence to stand trial are free,
121. See supra Part 11.
122. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 119 (2002).
123. Id. at 214.
124. Id. at 285.
125. It is at this point in the criminal proceedings that criminal culpability is either pursued by the
prosecutor or abandoned in light of the physician's determination. In the latter case, the species of
proceedings varies greatly from those taking place as a result of the former because the interest of the
state is no longer predominantly punishment of the defendant, but rather emphasizes others' safety from
the defendant as well as the defendant's own safety.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2000).
127. Id.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2000).
129. Id.
2004]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
at least temporarily, from penal incarceration; however, their progress is monitored
during a period of court-ordered institutional commitment.
130
Defendants lacking competence keep the close attention of the jurisdiction
that has an interest in prosecuting them. The state commits such persons to the
custody of the Attorney General who, in turn, hospitalizes them.' 31  This
hospitalization term may last for a reasonable amount of time not to exceed four
months, during which further inquiries are made into the defendant's mental
health. 32  Instead of determining whether illness and disease exist, the health
professional must determine prospectively whether the condition will persist
interminably. 133 In that instance, health care professionals are forced to make
quasi-judicial determinations that are outside the scope of their traditional duties.
In light of recent decisions, health care professionals must determine
whether medication would restore the defendant's competence. They must also
engage in the prescription and administration processes of treatment methods. It is
unclear what standards prevail when the health care professional balances the
likely success of the medication and the ensuing trial. These factors are weighed
against the pursuit of other means of patient treatment that would not result in
probable incarceration.
B. Ancient Sources of Medical Ethics
Two historic sources are responsible for the content of most current
medical codes of ethics. Those materials may be riddled with archaic expressions,
however, they are still of great use to medical organizations as a quasi-legislative
history for their current codes. The Oath of Hippocrates 134 and The Prayer of
Maimonides' 35 provide valuable information as to what activities modem codes of
ethics mean to restrict, despite the fact that those activities and the social issues
surrounding them had not yet taken shape.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. According to the statute, this period of examination may continue for additional reasonable
periods until,
(A) [the defendant's] mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there
is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the competence to
permit the trial to proceed; or (B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;
whichever is earlier. Id.
133. Id.
134. HIPPOCRATIC OATH - CLASSICAL VERSION (Translation from Greek by Ludwig Edelstein,
LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION (1943)),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath classical.html (last updated Mar. 2001).
135. PRAYER OF MOSES MAIMONIDES, available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/methics
/methicsoath.html#1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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The Oath of Hippocrates states:
I SWEAR ... to ... follow that system of regimen which, according to
my ability and judgement [sic], I consider for the benefit of my patients,
and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no
deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and
in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion.
With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my Art ....
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the
sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and
corruption; and, further, from the seduction of females or males, of
freemen and slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional
service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men,
which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning
that all such should be kept secret. While I continue to keep this Oath
unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the
art, respected by all men, in all times.
136
At medical school graduation ceremonies, students take the Hippocratic
Oath before beginning careers as medical professionals. 137 Among the plethora of
promises included in the Oath, students pledge to practice the art of medicine
within the boundaries of the practitioner's ability and experience, to practice
medicine without corruption of any kind, and to keep the confidentiality of persons
treated. 138 Within the laundry list of professional responsibilities, several appear
ancient and outdated in contrast with others. For example, students must consider
their instructors as parents, the children of those instructors as brethren, and share
with this extended family the practitioner's income as necessary.' 39 Obviously,
some of the oath is outdated. 140 Although changing social norms render some
features of a historic text obsolete, it does not nullify the underlying principles that
guide the profession.
The Hippocratic Oath is reliable as an ethics measuring stick despite its
unofficial legal status. Calling the Oath an "embarrassment"' 14 1 is a hypercritical
oversight and a failure to recognize that many of the standards by which people
live and act are not codified. The Ten Commandments clearly rebut such
arguments that the principle of "Do No Harm" is weightless because of its non-
136. HIPPOCRATIC OATH, supra note 134.
137. NOVA ONLINE, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH TODAY: MEANINGLESS RELIC OR INVALUABLE
MORAL GUIDE?, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath today.html (last updated Mar. 2001).
138. See HIPPOCRATIC OATH, supra note 134.
139. Id.
140. See MICHAEL DAVIS, JUSTICE IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH 73-74 (1996).
141. Id.
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legal status. 142 The Commandments are not a legally cognizable body of law. 143 It
could not be argued that honoring one's parents is a legal requisite,' 44 particularly
in cases of abuse and abandonment where obedience would not serve the best
interest of the child. However, on the whole, people still act with a certain respect
for their parents. What about adultery? Some states, such as Maine, treat adultery
only as a recognized reason for divorce. 145 Other states criminalize adultery as a
misdemeanor punishable by a $10 dollar fine.' 46 While the penalty is not sizeable,
there must be some form of consensus that holds that adultery is not ethical.
Moreover, the fact that the Ten Commandments include an outdated provision
regarding the crafting of graven images of the Lord, 147 the underlying principles of
the Ten Commandments are not nullified.
Michael Davis further argues that the principle of "Do No Harm" is
weightless due to current, conventional medical practice. 14 8  He claims that
physicians violate the Hippocratic Oath every day by performing tests on animals,
healing soldiers, prescribing dangerous drugs, and performing clinical trials on
patients. 149  He concludes that this principle cannot limit physicians from
participating in executions because physicians can perpetrate harm without
violating the Oath. 150 This logic is faulty. His arguments are based wholly upon
instances cast in an overly cynical light that forces physicians to engage in
backtalk. Taking Davis' example of amputation, physicians must remove a limb
from a patient to prevent the spread of disease throughout the entire body.'
15
Choosing between a reduced, though significant harm (loss of a limb), and the
gravest of harms (loss of life) physicians must logically choose a course of action
that will harm a patient if only to achieve a greater good.152 In the case of a
physician treating a mentally ill patient who is sentenced to death, the physician's
decision to treat the patient with medication provides minimal benefit to the patient
in comparison with the result of that treatment - the patient's execution. In effect,
142. The complete text of the Ten Commandments can be found in the Bible at Exodus 20:1-17
(New Revised Standard Version).
143. Some of the Commandments have been codified in every state, e.g., "You Shall Not Murder."
See e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-201 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2003).
144. Though, on some occasions such respect may be ordered in juvenile court as a means of
adjudicating a sentence.
145. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 902 (West 2002).
146. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (2002) (prescribing the criminal penalty for
adultery).
147. Exodus 20:4.
148. DAVIS, supra note 140, at 74-75.
149. DAVIS, supra note 140, at 74-75.
150. DAVIS, supra note 140, at 75.
151. DAVIS, supra note 140, at 74.
152. DAVIS, supra note 140, at 75. Although Davis notes that physicians don't always choose
courses of action that operate to achieve a greater good (e.g. plastic surgery, sex change operations,
etc.). Id.
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the current dilemma proposes a scenario that directly contradicts Davis' example.
Thus, participating in an execution has no such foreseeable good.
The Prayer of Maimonides provides another strong influence on modem
ethics. 153 This 1 2 th century statement of professional ethics, second only to the
Oath of Hippocrates in its influence on modem ethics, owes its origin to Islam. 1
5 4
As one might expect, every passage in the Prayer praises God in some way. 155 Of
particular interest, the Prayer of Maimonides thanks "Almighty God" for
"endow[ing] man with the wisdom to relieve the sufferings of his brother, [and] to
recognize his disorders."'156 According to the precepts contained therein, it is the
duty of the physician to "watch over the life and health of... creatures ... rich
and poor, good and bad, enemy as well as friend.' ' 157 An arguable interpretation of
this medley is that those who subscribe to this Prayer are bound ethically to protect
mentally ill prisoners from execution.
C. Current Trends in Medical Ethics
The American Medical Association (AMA) publishes a Code of Medical
Ethics and Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs that
outlines the basic principles of ethics that effect health care professionals. 158 The
authors of the Code explicitly state that the Oath of Hippocrates exists as a "living
statement of ideals to be cherished by the physician.' ' 159 Despite the early origin of
the Oath, probably in the 5 th century B.C., it has remained as "an expression of
ideal conduct for the physician.' 160 The Opinions contained in the AMA Code
provide illumination on the official perspectives on current social policy and act as
necessary commentary on the code as affected by that sentiment.
Opinion 2.06 on Capital Punishment' 61 demonstrates the AMA's scathing
response to the death penalty. In the Opinion, the AMA recognizes the internal
conflict that may exist for health care professionals. 162 The AMA explicitly
denounces participation by a health care professional in state sanctioned
153. PRAYER OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 135.
154. PRAYER OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 135.
155. PRAYER OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 135.
156. PRAYER OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 135.
157. PRAYER OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 135.
158. AMA, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2002-2003
ed.).
159. Id. atx.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 17.
162. See id. at 18.
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executions. 163 While activities are categorized for the purpose of this
classification, the categorization defines activities too generally.' 64 Because the
term "participate" is open to broad interpretation, the AMA describes some
activities that the definition may encompass in explicit detail.,65  The Opinion
emphatically states that "[w]hen a condemned prisoner has been declared
incompetent to be executed, physicians should not treat the prisoner for the
purpose of restoring competence unless a commutation order is issued before
treatment begins.' 66
The AMA continues to reinforce its organizational disapproval of the death
penalty and, specifically, the participation of health care professionals in state
sanctioned executions. In Resolution 5, the AMA supports a death penalty
moratorium. 167 Resolution 6 extends the AMA crusade by formally opposing laws
and administrative rules that might require physician participation in executions
and that might attempt to protect the identity of physicians who participate in
executions. 168 Physician participation includes direct conduct, such as
administering drug cocktails in lethal injections or examining pulmonary activity
after an electrocution, and indirect conduct, such as evaluation of competency, that
leads to the death of a prisoner. 169 These resolutions and the above Opinion clearly
demonstrate that the AMA strictly condemns physician participation in legal
executions.
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) issued a position statement
similarly endorsing a moratorium on the death penalty.' 70  In the statement, the
APA commented on evidence witnessed specifically by the APA and evidence
163. AMA, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 17 (2002-2003
ed.).
164. Id. The categories specified in the Opinion are: "(1) an action which would directly cause the
death of the condemned; (2) an action which would assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of
another individual to directly cause the death of the condemned; (3) an action which could
automatically cause an execution to be carried out on a condemned prisoner." Id.
165. Id. The AMA expressly includes the following as activities included in their definition of
"participate:"
[P]rescribing or administering tranquilizers and other psychotropic agents and medications that are part
of the execution procedure; monitoring vital signs on site or remotely (including monitoring
electrocardiograms); attending or observing an execution as a physician; ... rendering of technical
advice regarding execution[;] ... selecting injection sites; starting intravenous lines as a port for a lethal
injection device; prescribing, preparing, administering, or supervising injection drugs or their doses or
types; inspecting, testing, or maintaining lethal injection devices; and consulting with or supervising
lethal injection personnel.
Id.
166. Id. at 18.
167. AMA House of Delegates, Resolution 5 (recieved Apr. 14, 2003).
168. AMA Resolution 6 (H-140.963 reaffirmed 2001).
169. See AMA, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 163, at 17.
170. APA, DOC. No. 200006, MORATORIUM ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
POSITION STATEMENT (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter APA POSITION STATEMENT 2000].
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noted by the American Bar Association.' 17  According to the statement, the APA
was concerned chiefly with the treatment of the "mentally ill and developmentally
disabled" by the criminal justice system in current capital sentencing processes. 7 2
Because APA membership consists largely (if not entirely) of physicians, in a
postscript the APA did not denounce the death penalty as an institution. 173 The
APA position that the death penalty "is administered in an unfair and arbitrary
manner" is more politically correct than the sentiment expressed twenty years
earlier. 74 In its earlier statement, the APA likened physicians who participate in
executions to the physicians who committed violent atrocities in Nazi Germany.
175
Though the APA apparently has refocused its energy on the procedural
applications of capital punishment, its message has not faded - physicians are
ethically forbidden from participating in state sanctioned executions.
D. The Problem of Dual Loyalty
The problem of dual loyalty affects medical professionals who treat
incarcerated criminals. 176 As apparent in the codes of ethics already discussed, a
physician's first responsibility is to the health of the patient. 77  Practical
applications tend to complicate matters, though. Dual loyalty is defined as
"clinical role conflict between professional duties to a patient and obligation,
express or implied, real or perceived, to the interests of a third party such as an
employer, an insurer or the state."' 178 In the case of an execution, the physician is
forced to answer to the interests of the state, which may potentially be the
171. Id. ("Whereas the American Bar Association has concluded that the death penalty is
administered in an unfair and arbitrary manner and has recommended a moratorium on executions until
proper reforms are implemented .....
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Compare id. with APA, DOC. No. 800002, MEDICAL PARTICIPATION IN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: POSITION STATEMENT (June 1980) [hereinafter APA POSITION STATEMENT 1980].
175. APA POSITION STATEMENT 1980, supra note 174.
176. See ROCHELLE GRAFF SALGUERO, MEDICAL ETHICS AND COMPETENCY TO BE EXECUTED, 96
YALE L.J. 167, 176 (1986). Salguero refers to this conflict as "dual allegiances," describing the
resulting "concem that that the medical well-being of a patient is subordinate to duties to the employer."
176. Id. In her article, Salguero discusses the involvement of medical practitioners in the criminal
justice system in the wake of the Ford decision.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 155-69.
178. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNIV. OF CAPE TowN, DUAL LOYALTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (2002)[hereinafter, DUAL LOYALTY], available at http://www.phrusa.org/healthrights
/dual_loyalty.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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physician's employer. 179 In cases of mere incarceration, the state's elevation of its
interests over those of physician employees may serve important social purposes
and may be considered justifiable.' However, what is the outcome when the
patient is mentally ill? More importantly, to whom is the physician more
responsible in such a case?
Dual loyalty includes the duties of the health care professional to various
parties in addition to the patient. Generally, the health care professional may be
responsible to the community, family members, employers, insurance companies
and governments.' 8' In some cases, responsibilities to these third parties conflict
with the responsibilities of the health professional to the patient. 182 Departures
from the loyalty owed to the principle beneficiary of treatment may include
evaluating the patient, breaching the confidentiality owed to a patient to protect
others from violence or communicative diseases, and involuntarily medicating
patients. 183 Overall, such departures require a finding that the conflicting interest is
(1) justifiable, and (2) consistent with human rights.' 84  The Eighth Circuit
apparently reasoned that its "medicate-to-execute" scheme is such an acceptable
departure.
Conflicts in loyalty may arise for several reasons. Routine pressures
include "legal requirements, threats of professional or personal harm for non-
compliance, the culture of the institution or society where the professional
practices, or even the professional's own sense of duty to the state."' 85 These
consequences may be extremely severe for the professional, especially those
employed in institutions such as prisons and jails.' 86 State-based pressures are
likely to be insurmountable in capital punishment cases where the nature of the
crime and the community response call for the execution to take place.
The two greatest causes of the dual loyalty problem, which also contribute
immeasurably to the persistence of the problem, are lack of training and structural
flaws. 18 7 Generally, health care professionals do not receive the training needed to
179. See generally Stacy A. Ragon, Comment: A Doctor's Dilemma: Resolving the Conflict
Between Physician Participation in Executions and the AMA 's Code of Medical Ethics, 20 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 975 (1995). In her discussion of this conflict, Ragon takes an historic approach to show that
physicians have actively participated in capital punishment. Id. at 976-77. She further develops how
the AMA is ill-equiped to combat this problem. See id. at 991. In her conclusion, she opines that states
should not create situations in which this conflict of interest occurs. Id. at 1007.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
185. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
186. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178. This may be due, in part, to the fact that these institutions
are closed to the public in most senses. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
187. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
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identify and overcome these situations. 88 While codes of ethics exist, they do not
provide protocol for assessing third party demands.189 This leaves the health care
professional stranded to evaluate the justifications of the state on his or her own.' 90
Left to a passive role, the professional is unable to advocate effectively for the
patient's rights. 191 In order to defeat this element of the problem, mentoring
programs must be established in which burgeoning professionals may look to more
respected physicians for examples of how to respond to these pressures. It will
also be necessary for medical organizations to lobby more aggressively for the
creation of standard regulations that will guide their actions when put in
professional jeopardy.
The second cause of the dual loyalty problem, structural flaws, is grounded
in the nature of the relationships between health care professionals and third
parties. The four most recognized flaws include: "the nature of employment
relationships with the state; administrative mechanisms that lack procedures for
contesting state demands; disincentives to promote human rights; and licensing and
professional organizations that play no part in providing support to health care
professionals when they are challenged in meeting their human rights
obligations."' 192 Propositions made in response to this problem include relationship
restructuring, creation of administrative mechanisms, and collective action.'
93
Health care professionals need to proactively pursue the establishment of these
systems if future pressures are to be disarmed.
The Eighth Circuit enunciated the problems flowing from dual loyalty
with its decision in Singleton. The court reasoned that society's interest in carrying
out the imposed sentence outweighs Singleton's interest in remaining free from
unwanted medication. 194 However failing to consider the eventual responsibility
that the treating health care professional will bear, the court has ordered
participating physicians to violate their codes of ethics. In other words, the court
chooses to put the professional's relationship with the state ahead of the
professional's responsibility to the patient. More precisely, the health care
professional must condemn the patient because the state so commands. The
Supreme Court failed to recognize the gravity of this conflict. Most importantly,
the Supreme Court balked at the opportunity to head off a steamrolling debate with
a demonstration of pragmatic decisiveness. While the Court could have summarily
resolved these conflicts by eliminating their occurrence altogether, instead it
acquiesced, allowing the problem to develop further.
188. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
189. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
190. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
191. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
192. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
193. DUAL LOYALTY, supra note 178.
194. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).
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E. Bridging the Gap
The Court should have addressed the issue of dual loyalty by considering
Singleton and its progeny on certiorari and eliminating circumstances in which
physicians are forced to condemn patients to state sanctioned executions because
of treatment with psychotropic medication. Though the Court is not bound by the
Hippocratic Oath when drafting opinions, it has shown consideration of
physicians' ethics in the past.' 95 In this instance, the Court could have chosen to
categorically foreclose the availability of the death penalty for persons who may
become competent as a result of the administration of medication. An opinion to
this effect would surely be in line with the precedent set forth in Ford v.
Wainwright. 1
96
By eliminating the death penalty in involuntary medication cases, the Court
would remove ethical concerns from the minds of physicians treating incompetent
defendants and would allow those physicians to act exclusively according to their
obligations to their patients. Singleton raised these concerns in his discussion of
the Eighth Amendment when he argued that "the medical profession recoils from
participation in executions."' 197 Appellant urges the Court of Appeals to adopt the
commutation approach to this solution.' 98 The commutation approach, in which
the death sentence is displaced en lieu of a life sentence without the possibility of
parole, resolves this inherent conflict.' 99 If the commutation approach is adopted,
physicians could freely treat incompetent prisoners without the added concern that
the treatment rendered would precipitate the execution of the patient.
Conservative jurisdictions would be unlikely to adopt the commutation
approach as imagined by Singleton. First, a court arguably should not act solely in
the interest of third parties, such as treating physicians, when determining how to
punish a criminal offender. While this argument almost certainly would alienate
physicians employed to treat criminal offenders, it is not without merit. Second, a
195. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 130-32 (1973).
196. 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the
insane).
197. Appellant's Brief at 32, Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) [Hereinafter
Appellant's Briefi, available at 2000 WL 33983423.
198. Id. at 33-34. Appellant cites another brief and the Maryland statutory approach to support his
"simple" answer to this conflict in ethics and treatment. Id.
199. Id. The inherent conflict is enunciated by Singleton as the following: "if the state requests
treatment specifically so that the prisoner's competence for execution can be reevaluated, the intent of
the treatment is quite different. No longer to promote the health of the prisoner, the purpose of
treatment is to allow execution." Id. at 33. As an aside, the commutation approach would not likely
trigger anti-abolitionist aggression in more conservative jurisdictions because it creates this
commutation exception only in these extreme instances.
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conservative bench would not likely be disposed to create an exception for persons
who may be competent at any point in the criminal justice process - from
commission of the crime through the execution. It would be highly unlikely to
expect the most conservative jurisdictions to promote progressive safe harbors
when the Supreme Court has created more uniformity across age of majority death
penalty jurisprudence. °° Third, conservative courts would likely be more
concerned with the prospect of being duped by offenders who are trying to
manipulate the system to have their lives spared.20 1 Though not exclusive, the
above arguments illustrate the potential breadth of opposition to the commutation
approach.
Physicians' ethics set forth a standard of decency by which criminal
punishment should be measured. Singleton argued that the "punishment must not
be unacceptable to contemporary society., 20 2 Despite the ancient origins of ethical
codes of professional conduct, the same codes are updated nearly as often as
203conflicts arise. As such, the opinions and resolutions that flow from the AMA
and similar medical entities act as modem measures of social standards. The
opinions and resolutions are drafted by persons who encounter these conflicts often
enough to understand the dilemmas they raise, and the proposed solutions are
drafted with current trends in ethics and social norms in mind. For these reasons,
these resources are appropriate materials for the Court to consider when deciding
how to deal with the ethical implications of medicate-to-execute scenarios.
III. CONCLUSION
As a general principle of constitutional law, states are permitted to provide
more protection for their citizens than is provided in the U.S. Constitution. It is not
permissible for states to impinge the minimum protections given to citizens.
Though public support for the death penalty may wax and wane, the law must
strive to be more static. The Supreme Court must take its jurisprudence a step
further to provide an impenetrable defense for individuals lacking competence to
be executed. When presented with the opportunity to do so, the Court must hold
200. For example, conservative courts have narrowed the exceptions that once existed for persons
suffering from mental retardation and minors who are charged as adults. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (reversing the Virginia Supreme Court and holding that the execution of the mentally
retarded is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty on an individual who
was 16 at the time of the commission of the crime is not cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment).
201. Singleton makes a brief attempt to address this concern. Appellant's Brief, supra note 184 at
29.
202. Appellant's Brief, supra note 197 at 32. Again, Appellant makes this argument in his brief
discussing the Eighth Amendment. Appellant's Brief, supra note 197 at 32.
203. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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that it is cruel and unusual to execute persons who are forcibly medicated. The
current standard allows for unacceptable inconsistency.
The current standard similarly binds the hands of health care professionals
who are willing to treat mentally ill defendants. Until health care professionals can
remove themselves from the shadow of the state, dual loyalty will continue to be a
problem. Physicians must be able to practice without having to combat the
pressures of the state and society. Instead of extending the role of the health
professional, it may be best to perfect the roles already created and focus on how
best to serve the patient in those capacities. The Court must overturn Singleton in
order to preserve the medical profession's ethical standards. The bottom line is
that physicians should not be forced to breach the principles of modem ethics by
participating in the "medicate-to-execute" scheme of justice ordered by the Eighth
Circuit.
